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Analysis of the MAS Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
_o_ Preparation of FMEA and CIL, chanae 2j pRCBD 40107D, 28
March, 1987. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of
the hardware to determine draft failure modes, criticality, and
potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA
results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA
FMEA/CIL baseline that was available. A resolution of each
discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional
analysis as required_ However, due to the cancellation of the
IOA task, the resolution of these discrepancies were not
attempted. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and
recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the
time. This report documents the results of that comparison for
the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) hardware.
The MAS hardware is required for performing critical functions of
crew ingress/egress, air data parameter data acquisition, thermal
protection of the elevon spar, fittings and External Tank (ET)
umbilical cavities, communications support via the Tracking and
Data Relay Satellite, target tracking during rendezvous and
proximity operations, access for cargo to the payload bay,
support for the ATCS and enables pressurized control of
unpressurized compartments during transient pressure periods and
environmental control during static pressure periods.











Air Data Probe (ADP)
Elevon Seal Panel (ESP)
External Tank Umbilical (ETU)
Ku-Band Deploy (KBD)
Payload Bay Doors (PBD)
Payload Bay Radiators (PBR)
Personnel Hatches (PH)
Vent Door Mechanism (VDM)
Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM)
1
The IOA analysis process utilized available MAS hardware
drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies,
components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was
evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects.
Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect
for each failure mode.
The IOA product for the MAS independent analysis consisted of 685
failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in 476 potential critical
items being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product
to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of presentation
charts to NSTS Level I/II Review Board for MAS FMEA/CIL Review
through 5 february, 1988. The NASA Baseline Charts used for
comparison consisted of FMEA/CIL Summary Sheets for 510 FMEAs and
comprehensive CIL Documentation for 252 CILs. The difference in
the number of IOA analysis worksheets and NASA FMEAs can be
explained by the different levels of analysis detail performed to
identify failure modes. The comparison determined if there were
any results found by the IOA that were not included in the NASA
baseline.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the nine major subdivisions of the MAS. A summary of
the number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented
below with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
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For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Critical Items is presented as follows:























































































The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to re-address
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS
Office has undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for
the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL re-evaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
re-evaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs which is
documented in this report.
Step l. O Subsystem Familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 MAS Ground Rules and Assumptions
The MAS ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined
in Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were defined
to limit the analysis to single-failed-parts for each failure
mode. A subset of the "failure mode" and "causes" keywords were




3.1 Design and Function
The MAS consists of the electrical power, display, control and
mechanism hardware associated with the ADP, ESP, ETU, KBD, PLD,
PBR, PH, VDM and SDM. Figure 2 shows this breakdown. More
specifically, the MAS consists of the following components:
i. The Air Data Probe (ADP) consists of hardware required to
sense atmospheric conditions and provide digital data
to the GNC subsystem for display and control of the Orbiter
during the Terminal Area Energy Management (below 14K alt-
itude and Mach 5) and landing phase. Pressure data is
provided below Mach 2.5 to compute angle of attack, accel-
eration, Mach/clean air mass velocity, equivalent and true
airspeed, barometric altitude, and descent rate. Prior to
this point the flight parameters are computed using inertial
sensed acceleration data and a ground/airborne computed state
vector. A temperature sensor on the head of the probe was
designed to provide outside air temperature to be used to
compute the true and equivalent airspeeds. This data is no
longer used by the Orbiter GNC subsystem.
The Mechanical Actuation Assembly consists of a probe
housing mounted to the Orbiter Inner Mold Line and contains
the dual operational redundant three phase AC motors,
reduction gear drive and mechanical linkage required to
rotate the probe mast from'its stowed position to its de-
ployed position in the Orbiter air stream. A three position
lever-lock switch for each probe allows the pilot or
commander to deploy the probe and turn the heaters on if
required. Deployment will occur within 15 seconds with two
motors operating or 30 seconds with only one motor operating.
The two motors for each probe are powered by separate Main
AC buses so that any one main AC bus can be used to deploy
at least one ADP. When the probe is fully deployed, a limit
switch is closed which provides feedback to the Motor Control
Assembly which then removes power from the motors. This same
Motor Control Assembly signal which removes power from the
motors also closes a set of relays that enable the heater
function of the three position switch. All three heaters in
any one probe are powered by the same Forward Power Controller
in the Orbiter. In order to stow either ADP, a separate two
position lever-lock switch must be activated toenable the
stow position of the deploy/heat switch. When fully
stowed, redundant stow limit switches will provide a
signal to the Motor Control Assembly to remove power from
the motors. Reference Figure 3 and Figure 4.
2. Elevons may be deflected from 0 to 40 degrees up
(negative) and 0 to 25 degrees down (positive). As the
elevons traverse the 65 degrees, the Elevon Seal Panels
(ESP) track the elevons and limits heat flow to the
elevon spar and fittings. There are 34 outboard and
inboard Elevon Seal Panel linkage mechanisms used to
move the 30 Elevon Seal Panels. The linkage mechanism is
attached to the elevon with a clevis and is attached to
the Elevon Seal Panel with another clevis. Thus the
mechanism is driven by elevon displacement and maintains
appropriate clearances between the edge of the elevon and
the Elevon Seal Panel over the 65 degrees of elevon
movement. Reference Figure 5 and Figure 6.
3. The Orbiter External Tank Umbilical (ETU) Doors
protect the aft Orbiter ET Umbilical Cavities from
aerodynamic heating. The ET Umbilical Cavities contain
the aft Orbiter/ET attachment points, the LOX and LH2
feedlines, and electrical connectors. The two ET
Umbilical Doors are held open during ascent by two
centerline latches.
These latches have to be released before the doors can be
closed. Each door is closed by an actuator and
mechanical linkages. On the inside of each cavity are
three uplock latches which engage three uplock rollers on
each door. The latches prevent the door from vibrating
or re-opening. The Umbilical Doors are closed and
latched by the crew'manually except in the event of an
RTLS or contingency abort when the closure sequence is
done by the GNC software. Reference Figure 7 and Figure
8.
4. The Ku-Band Antenna is utilized to support commun-
ications via the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
or to support target tracking during rendezvous and
proximity operations. The Ku-Band Deploy (KBD) Mechanism
facilitates the Ku-Band Antenna as it performs these dual
functions. The Deployment Mechanism consists of the
Deployed Assembly, the Deployment Mechanism Subsystem and
the Electronics Assembly I. The Electronics Assembly is
located in the Forward Avionics Bay 3A. All other
components are located on the Starboard Payload Bay Sill
Longeron at approximately Z=410, X=589, and Y=IO0. The
Deployed Assembly consists of the Antenna Dish, Deployed
Electronics Assembly, Gimbal Mechanism, Gimbal Lock
Mechanism, 2 Lock Pins, 2 Motors and 2 Microswitches.
The Deployment Mechanism Subsystem consists of an
Actuator Assembly with 2 motors, differential and gear
box and a Deployment Mechanism with 2 deploy/stow limit
switches, housing, input/output shaft, balls, Hardstop
and Jettison Assembly with guillotine wire cutter and
Structural Separation Systems, and frangible nut/bolt.
Reference Figure 9 and Figure i0.
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5. The Payload Bay Doors (PBD) are comprised of left-hand and
right-hand doors hinged at the Orbiter midfuselage and
latched at the forward and aft fuselage bulkheads. The left
and right doors also are latched along the top centerline.
The doors are 60 feet long. They are constructed of graphite/
epoxy composite material. The left door weighs 2,375 pounds
and the right door weighs 2,535 pounds. The right door is
heavier because it carries the active centerline latch
mechanisms. The closed PBD provide the aerodynamic faring
required for the midfuselage and complete the environmental
envelope for the payload bay. The PBD react fuselage
torsional loads, support their own flight and purge pressure
loadings, and support the radiators.
There are 16 centerline latches, 8 aft bulkhead latches, and
8 forward bulkhead latches which hold the doors in the closed
position. The latches are grouped in gangs of four. Each gang
has its own pair of actuating motors, gearbox and drive mechan-
ism.
The Payload Bay Doors Mechanical Subsystem consists of three
parts. These are the Centerline Latch Mechanism, the Bulkhead
Latch Mechanism, and the Door Drive. Reference Figure Ii and
Figure 12.
6. The Payload Bay Radiator (PBR) Deploy Mechanism provides
the capability to release, deploy, stow and latch the two
forward port and starboard radiator panels on the Payload
Bay Doors. The Deploy Mechanism consists of (i) a latch
system and (2) a deployment system. The Latch and
Deployment Mechanisms are located on the Payload Bay
Doors while the Passive Latch Rollers and the Radiator
Hinge Plates are on the radiator panels.
Each deployable radiator is secured to the PBD in the
stowed position by six ganged latches. One latch PDU on
each panel contains two 3-phase motors used to latch or
release the six latches/panel simultaneously. PDU motor
output drives, via torque shafts, three rotary actuators
on each panel. As the torque shaft rotates, the rotary
actuator arm is displaced 53 degrees. This rotational
displacement drives two latch hooks, connected to the
actuator arm by push rods, bellcranks and links, to the
latch or release state.
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The Radiator Deployment System consists of PDUs (one per
side), torque shafts, rotary actuators (two per panel),
deployment cranks and connecting links. Deployment
PDUs, torque shafts and rotary actuators are basically
the same as in the Latch System except for rotational
displacement of the rotary actuator which is 92 degrees
during deployment operations. This rotational
displacement is applied to a deployment crank attached to
the output arm of the Rotary Actuator, which drives the
Radiator Panel to a deployed or stowed state. A
deployment mechanism disconnect feature allows for manual
disconnect of the Deployment Crank by EVA crewman in the
event of a failed radiator. Reference Figure 13 through
Figure 20.
7. The Personnel Hatches (PH) allow crew and service personnel
ingress and egress capability to the Orbiter. There are
three hatches, the Ingress/Egress Hatch, which allows access
to the Orbiter, and two Airlock Hatches, which allow access
to the airlock and payload bay. All three hatches are on the
middeck and are of a similar design.
Each of the three hatches consist of the following hardware:
Actuator, Hatch Crank, Latches, O-Rings, and Purge Ports. In
addition to the above hardware the Entry Hatch has a 10 inch
viewport. The crank will rotate 450 degrees clockwise and
counterclockwise. When the crank is rotated the actuator
opens and closes the latches. The Entry Hatch has 18 latches
and the Airlock Hatches have 6. These latches pull the hatch
flush with the bulkhead and the O-rings form an airtight seal
(see figure 24). The Purge Ports equalize the pressure be-
tween the two sides of the hatch. This allows the hatch to
be easily opened. Reference Figure 21 through Figure 24.
8. The Vent Door Mechanism (VDM) enables pressure control of
unpressurized compartments during transient pressure
periods and environmental control during static pressure
periods. There are eighteen doors which the Door
Mechanism actuates electromechanically. The doors
provide pressure and environmental control for the
Forward RCS, Forward Fuselage Plenum, Mid Fuselage,
Payload Bay, Aft Fuselage, Vertical Fin, OMS Pods and
Wheel Wells. The Door Mechanism consists of 24 inde-
pendently powered three-phase AC motors, connected via
a differential gearbox and torque shaft/slip clutch
to bellcranks, linkages, rod assembly with bolts, nuts,
washers, cotterpins, microswitch position indicators,
etc. Reference Figure 25 through Figure 27.
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9. The Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM) enables an aperture
in the orbiter skin on orbit in the Y & Z axis and
provides protection for the Startracker and compartment
during ascent and entry. The two doors are actuated
electro-mechanically. Each Door Mechanism consists of
two independently powered three-phase AC motors connected
via a differential gearbox/train, actuator output and
limit switches to either the Y or Z door. Reference
Figure 28 and Figure 29.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The MAS interfaces with many onboard Orbiter systems including
the Active Thermal Control System (ATCS), Air Surface Controls
used for guidance and control, Crew, Guidance and Navigation,
Communication and Tracking, Data Processing System, Electrical
Power Display & Control, Elevons, External Tank Umbilical Door,
Guidance & Navigation, and Purge, Vent & Drain Doors.
The MAS hardware is located throughout the Orbiter and interfaces
primarily with the structure, electrical power, display and
controls. The Air Data Probe and Startracker Door are
located forward of the crew cabin. Personnel Hatches provide
ingress/egress to the crew cabin. Ku-Band Deployment Mechanism,
Payload Bay Doors, and the Payload Bay Radiator Deployment
Mechanism are located in the Payload Bay. Purge, Vent and Drain
Doors are located on each side of the Orbiter. The Elevon Seal
Panels are located on top of each wing. ET Umbilical Doors are
on the bottom side of the Orbiter.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the MAS hardware and
the corresponding subcomponents. Figures 3 through 23 comprise



































































































Figure 5 - ELEVON SEAL PANEL LINKAGE
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Figure 8 - ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM OVERVIEW
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Figure 9 - Ku-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
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Figure 16 - POWER DRIVE UNIT (TYPICAL)
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Figure 28 - STARTRACKER DOOR MECHANISM
JS
Figure 29 - STARTRACKER DOOR MECHANISM OVERVIEW
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the MAS hardware initially generated 685
failure mode worksheets and identified 476 Potential Critical
Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In order to
facilitate comparison, 28 additional failure mode analysis
worksheets were generated. These analysis results were compared
to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline (5 February, 1988) of 510
FMEAs and 252 CIL items. The discrepancy between the number of
IOA and NASA FMEAs can be explained by the different approach
used by NASA and IOA to group failure modes. The Level I/II
presentations included detailed information on the CIL items which
provided for a good comparison of the FMEA and IOA criticality
results. For these items if a discrepancy existed, IOA made a
specific recommendation either accepting the FMEA results or
suggesting a change. The criticality summary listing showed only
the criticality, screens, and the failure modes for each
mechanical/electrical hardware item. Consequently, it was
difficult to understand the rationale behind the criticalities in
order to make an adequate assessment between the FMEA and the IOA
results. In these cases if a discrepancy was noted, it was
flagged as an issue pending receipt of more detailed data.
However, due to the termination of the IOA task, this later
process was not pursued and the discrepancies remain as marked
issues. Also, due to limited time remaining on the task, no FMEA
issue was discussed with the subsystem manager in order to
resolve them. Upon completion of the assessment, and after
proposed discussions with the NASA subsystem manager and receipt
of all FMEAs, then an agreement between the NASA FMEAs and IOA
failure modes would be achieved.
In the analysis and assessment report, the MAS was divided into
nine sections according to hardware and function. In the
following Table I, the unmapped IOA column is the raw number of
IOA failure modes. The mapped IOA column is the number of IOA
failure modes after they have been mapped into the NASA FMEAs.
The issues column is the IOA failure modes that were unable to be
mapped onto NASA FMEAs.
4O
Table I Summary of IOA-NASA Mapping of Failure Modes














































TOTAL 713 530 252 259
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous
analysis results reported in Space Transportation System
Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No.
1.0-WP-VA87001-03, Analysis of the MAS, 30 November, 1987.
Appendix F provides a cross reference betweeD the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA recommendations are also
summarized.
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
Table II Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment
MAS


































TOTAL 510 713 213
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A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table III.
Table III Summary of IOA CIL Assessment
MAS

































TOTAL 252 476 310
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Detailed assessment results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix E. Table IV presents a summary
of the failure criticalities for each of the nine major
subdivisions of the MAS. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in
subsequent paragraphs.
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Of the 510 failure modes analyzed, 64 failures were determined to
result in loss of crew or vehicle, and 142 were determined to
result in loss of mission. 252 were determined to be critical
items. A summary of the NASA Critical Items is presented in
Table V. Appendix D presents a cross-reference between each
Critical Item and a specific worksheet in Appendix E.
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The scheme for assigning IOA analysis (Appendix E) worksheet
numbers is shown in Table VI.


































Assessment Results - Air Data Probe
The ADP assessment examined the components required to
deploy the Orbiter Air Data Probes. The assessment
identified 8 mechanical and 28 EPD&C failure modes. The
assessment results identified 5 mechanical and I0 EPD&C CIs
and these are listed in Appendix D.
Assessment Results - Elevon Seal Panel
The ESP assessment examined the components of the 34 outboard
and inboard ESP linkage mechanisms. The assessment
identified 1 mechanical failure mode and 1 mechanical CI
which is listed in Appendix D.
Assessment Results - External Tank Umbilical
The ETU assessment examined the components required to
protect the Orbiter ET Umbilical Cavities from entry
heating. The assessment identified 32 mechanical and 70
EPD&C failure modes. The assessment results identified 21
mechanical and 24 EPD&C CIs and these are listed in
Appendix D.
Assessment Results - Ku Band Deploy
The KBD assessment examined the components required to
deploy/stow the Ku-Band Antenna. The assessment identified
55 EPD&C failure modes. The assessment results identified
21 CIs and these are listed in Appendix D.
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The PBD assessment examined the components used to open and
close the Payload Bay Doors. The assessment identified 57
mechanical and 15 EPD&C failure modes. The assessment
results identified 46 mechanical and 9 EPD&C CIs and these
are listed in Appendix D.
Assessment Results - Payload Bay Radiators
The PBR assessment examined the components involved in
latching and releasing, and deploying and stowing the
Payload Bay Radiators. The assessment identified 36
mechanical and 27 EPD&C failure modes. The assessment
results identified 29 mechanical and 5 EPD&C CIs and these
are listed in Appendix D.
Assessment Results - Personnel Hatches
The PH assessment examined the possible failures in the
components used to open and close the personnel hatches.
The assessment identified 30 mechanical failure modes.
There were I0 mechanical CIs'identified and these are listed
in Appendix D.
Assessment Results - Vent Door Mechanism
The VDM assessment examined the components involved in
opening/closing the Active Vent Doors and providing purge
control via these vent ports. The assessment identified 49
mechanical and 83 EPD&C failure modes. The assessment
results identified 43 mechanical and 22 EPD&C CIs and these
are listed in Appendix D. The NASA documentation for this
subsystem includes two additional FMEA/CILs (01-5B-380133-2
& 4-2). These FMEA/CILs are on hardware for passive venting
of the wing cavities during ascent and descent and are
included in P V & D Assessment Working Paper no 1.0-WP-
VA8805-02 dated 5 February, 1988.
Assessment Results - Startracker Door
The SDM assessment examined the components required to open/
close the Startracker Doors. The assessment identified
8 mechanical and ii EPD&C failure modes. The assessment
results identified 4 mechanical and 2 EPD&C CIs and these
are listed in Appendix D.
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AC - Alternating Current
ADP - Air Data Probe
AOA - Abort Once Around
ATCS - Active Thermal Control System
ATO - Abort To Orbit
BLKHD - Bulkhead
CI - Critical Item
CIL - Critical Items List
CL - Center Line
CRIT - Criticality
DPS - Data Processing System
ESP - Elevon Seal Panel
ET - External Tank
ETU - External Tank Umbilical
ETUD - ETU Door
EVA - Extravehicular Activity
F - Functional
FM - Failure Mode
FMEA - Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
GFE - Government Furnished Equipment
GN&C - Guidance, Navigation and Control
HW - Hardware
IOA - Independent Orbiter Assessment
KBD - Ku-Band Deploy
LRU - Line Replaceable Unit
MAS - Mechanical Actuation System
MDAC - McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
MTR - Motor
NA - Not Applicable
NASA - National,Aeronautics and Space Administration
NSTS - National Space Transportation System


















- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Potential Critical Item
- Power Drive Unit
- Personnel Hatches
- Payload Bay
- Payload Bay Doors
- Payload Bay Radiator
- Rockwell International
- Redundancy Management
- Remote Power Controller
- Redundant Set
- Return To Landing Site
- Startracker Door Mechanism
- Systems Management










- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Touch Down
- Translational Hand Controller
- Torque Limit Clutch
- Volts Direct Current
- Vent Door Mechanism
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Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22_06, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTL____S- begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AO__AA- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AT__OO- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of on-orbit phase prior
to planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP___SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear




DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL. 10 October 1986, was employed with the






The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error







All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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B.3 MAS-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System. The analysis
considered the worst case effects of the hardware or functional




This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen





= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :














NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA ADDRESSING THE PROBE DEVICE FOR THESE TWO FAILURE
MODES, IDENTIFIED BY IOA; A JAMMED PROBE DEVICE AND A CLOGGED
PROBE PRESSURE PORT.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS
AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA ADDRESSING THE PROBE DEVICE FOR THESE TWO FAILURE
MODES, IDENTIFIED BY IOA; A JAMMED PROBE DEVICE AND A CLOGGED
PROBE PRESSURE PORT.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS
AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING THE FAILURE OF THE
PROBE SHAFT. TWO FAILURE MODES IDENTIFIED BY IOA TASK; BROKEN
SHAFT AND/OR BENT SHAFT.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS
AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING THE FAILURE OF THE
PROBE SHAFT. TWO FAILURE MODES IDENTIFIED BY IOA TASK; BROKEN
SHAFT AND/OR BENT SHAFT.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS
AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.













HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.













HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] IN] IN] IN] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [ ]
NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.













HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.


















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.















LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEAFOUND ADDRESSING ADTAPOWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOUND ADDRESSING ADTA POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS.
FURTHER REVIEW OF IOA ANALYSIS IDENTIFIED SECOND HARDWARE FAILURE
WOULD BE APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.











ITEM: ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 100-105 (WASHER,
BUSHING, NUT, COTTER PIN, SAFETY WIRE, ETC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOa [ 1 /I ]












[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [










[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MECH/ETU-3512






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























[ / ] C ]
C 2/IR] C P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]














[ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]








[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























[ / ] [ ]
[ 2/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ .] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)






















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MECH/ETU-3527










[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MECH/ETU-3528






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ i [ ] c J C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING








[ 2 /IR ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING








[ / ] [ ]
[ 2/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (Sl & 2) ACTUATOR










[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/1R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 2) ACTUATOR
H.J. LOWERY
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MECH/KBD-4109






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]










[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 4101 - 4112
H.J. LOWERY
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[F] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 _2R ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ p ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOa [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























C / ] [ ]
[ 3/2R] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOa [ 3 /2R ]








[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























[ / ] [ ]
[ 311R] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























[ / ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




[ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
C ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 7 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























[ / ] [ ]
[ 311R] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOa [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ .] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]












C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]











[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















40 MS TIME DELAY




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















40 MS TIME DELAY









[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















4 SECOND TIME DELAY









[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: .(If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ i C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















40 MS TIME DELAY




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















40 MS TIME DELAY









[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] IF] [P]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















4 SECOND TIME DELAY




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[F] [P]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















4 SECOND TIME DELAY







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
IF] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/ZR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[F] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ p ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ p ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























[ / ] [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























[ / ] [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





















] [ ] •
] C ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]












[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ p ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]












[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















BULKHEAD READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH MODULE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

























PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
J. BACHER
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ 3 [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ p ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ]. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1/1 ]












[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MECH/PBD-5177










[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR PASSIVE STOP




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 2/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MECHANICAL POWER SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]








[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
[ / ] [ ]
[ 2/IR] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)





















NASA [ / ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















HDW/FUNC a B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















LIMIT SWITCHES, RELEASE (Sl), (S3),




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















LIMIT SWITCHES, LATCH ($2), (s3), (s4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [










[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/1R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























LIMIT SWITCHES, DEPLOY (SI, $2, $4)
W.T. SLAUGHTER
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























LIMIT SWITCHES, STOW (SI, $2, $3)
W.T. SLAUGHTER
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]












[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MECH/SDM-9102










[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES (S2 & 4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C
























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9100-9107




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9500
H.J. LOWERY
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 8100 - 8108
H.J. LOWERY
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























[ / ] [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]








[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]








[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















MCA AC POWER BUS




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ / ] [ ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOa [ 2 /IR ]











[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]











[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]











[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380101-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA]







C x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA]







[ X ] *
Ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8103
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8104
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380105-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8103
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380105-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380106-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380106-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380107-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [- ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8104
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380107-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380107-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380109-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.




ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8 i0 IB









NASA [ i /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8103
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTILRESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOAANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTILRESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380113-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8104
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[N] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8103
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8104
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380114-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8104
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380115-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]










CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8103
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8104
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380115-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8104
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380116-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOAANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380118-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380119-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380120-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8103
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380122-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380122-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING






HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (lf applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8104
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ] °
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]










CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380123-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380123-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] C N ] C N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380123-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380123-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01U5B-380123-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECO_fENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DEI_ETE)
* CIL RETENTION P_TIONALE[ (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
P_S:
IOA AGREES WITH THE F_4EA/CIL.
THE DISCP_P_CY BE_EN NASA F_A/CIL _D IOA ANALYSES _ M_D
AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WI_ THE SUBSYSTEM M_AGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380126-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8103
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380128-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING






HDW/FUNC a B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380130-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8104
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8103
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380130-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380131-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380131-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_mC A 8 C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/VDM
8104
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 01-5B-380131-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-2D/4-EI00-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








• HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]. [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]. [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
<





NASA FMEA #: 02-2D/4-EI00-1
SUBS YSTEM: MECH/ES P
MDAC ID: 2105
ITEM: BOLT




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















HDW/nmC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(AD_DELETE)




FURTHER EVALUATION PROMPTED UPGRADE OF HARDWARE CRITICALITY
ASHARDWARE FAILURE WOULD REQUIRE MISSION CANCELLATION. SCREEN B
DIFFERENCE REFLECTS IOA POSITION THAT LOSS OF REDUNDANT GEARBOX
OPERATION MAY NOT BE READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4-052000-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(AD_DELETE)




FURTHER EVALUATION PROMPTED UPGRADE OF HARDWARE CRITICALITY
ASHARDWARE FAILURE WOULD REQUIRE MISSION CANCELLATION. SCREEN B
DIFFERENCE REFLECTS IOA POSITION THAT LOSS OF REDUNDANT GEARBOX
OPERATION MAY NOT BE READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER EVALUATION PROMPTED UPGRADE OF HARDWARE CRITICALITY
ASHARDWARE FAILURE WOULD REQUIRE MISSION CANCELLATION. SCREEN B
DIFFERENCE REFLECTS IOA POSITION THAT LOSS OF REDUNDANT GEARBOX
OPERATION MAY NOT BE READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER EVALUATION PROMPTED UPGRADE OF HARDWARE CRITICALITY
ASHARDWARE FAILURE WOULD REQUIRE MISSION CANCELLATION. SCREEN B
DIFFERENCE REFLECTS IOA POSITION THAT LOSS OF REDUNDANT GEARBOX
OPERATION MAY NOT BE READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4-052000-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FURTHER EVALUATION PROMPTED UPGRADE OF HARDWARE CRITICALITY
ASHARDWARE FAILURE WOULD REQUIRE MISSION CANCELLATION. SCREEN B
DIFFERENCE REFLECTS IOA POSITION THAT LOSS OF REDUNDANT GEARBOX
OPERATION MAY NOT BE READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(AD_DELETE)




FURTHER EVALUATION PROMPTED UPGRADE OF HARDWARE CRITICALITY
ASHARDWARE FAILURE WOULD REQUIRE MISSION CANCELLATION. SCREEN B
DIFFERENCE REFLECTS IOA POSITION THAT LOSS OF REDUNDANT GEARBOX
OPERATION MAY NOT BE READILY APPARENT DURING FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4-054000-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA DELETED ADDRESSING PRESSURE LINE FAILURE.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED AS
AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C313 ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )











NASA FMEA #: 02-4A-593102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










HDW/FUNC A B C
[3/3 ] C ] [ ] [
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]













[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4A-593202-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER REVIEW, IOA CRITICALITY REVISED AND IN AGREEMENT
WITH NASA/RI FMEA CODE.













HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER REVIEW, IOA CRITICALITY REVISED AND IN AGREEMENT
WITH NASA/RI FMEA CODE.














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]









[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER REVIEW, IOA CRITICALITY REVISED AND IN AGREEMENT
WITH NASA/RI FMEA CODE.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
IN] IN] IN] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




CABIN ATMOSPHERE LEAKAGE CREATES POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF CREW AS
WELL AS MISSION. TIME AVAILABLE FOR CREWMEMBER TO REACH SAFE-
HAVEN IS DEPENDENT UPON OPERATIONAL SITUATION FACTORS AND/OR
ANOMOLIES.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4A-593202-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




CABIN ATMOSPHERE LEAKAGE CREATES POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF CREW AS
WELL AS MISSION. TIME AVAILABLE FOR CREWMEMBER TO REACH SAFE-
HAVEN IS DEPENDENT UPON OPERATIONAL SITUATION FACTORS AND/OR
ANOMOLIES.














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]













[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4A-593205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SIDE HATCH ATTENUATOR HINGE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]





NEW [ X ]
HECH/PH
17125













[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4A-593301-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH MECHANISM





NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] C ] [ ]
] [ ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4A-593302-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER REVIEW, IOA CRITICALITY REVISED AND IN AGREEMENT
WITH NASA/RI FMEA DATA.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4A-593302-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ P] [ P] [ P] IX] •
[p] [F] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER REVIEW, IOA CRITICALITY REVISED AND IN AGREEMENT
WITH NASA/RI FMEA DATA.














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOa [ 3 /IR ]






















NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER REVIEW, IOA CRITICALITY REVISED AND iN AGREEMENT
WITH NASA/RI FMEA DATA.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4A-593302-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




CABIN ATMOSPHERE LEAKAGE CREATES POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF CREW AS
WELL AS MISSION. TIME AVAILABLE FOR CREWMEMBER TO REACH SAFE-
HAVEN DEPENDENT UPON OPERATIONAL SITUATION FACTORS AND/OR
ANOMOLIES.














NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]













[ F ] [ P ]
[ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




CABIN ATMOSPHERE LEAKAGE CREATES POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF CREW AS
WELL AS MISSION. TIME AVAILABLE FOR CREWMEMBER TO REACH SAFE-
HAVEN DEPENDENT UPON OPERATIONAL SITUATION FACTORS AND/OR
ANOMOLIES.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4A-593302-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK HATCH LATCH LOCK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




CLOGGED/BLOCKED PRESSURE PORT COULD PREVENT EQUALIZATION OF
PRESSURE WITH MIDDECK, PREVENTING OPENING OF HATCH B DUE TO
AIRLOCK HIGH PRESSURE, POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW. ALSO INADVERTENT
LEAKAGE OF ATMOSPHERE CREATES POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF CREW.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]









[ ] C ] [
C ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [x]
] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CLOGGED/BLOCKED PRESSURE PORT COULD PREVENT EQUALIZATION OF
PRESSURE WITH MIDDECK, PREVENTING OPENING OF HATCH B DUE TO
AIRLOCK HIGH PRESSURE, POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW. ALSO INADVERTENT
LEAKAGE OF ATMOSPHERE CREATES POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF CREW.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR BRAKE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MECH/PBD-5133
02-4B-001-I
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5133

















[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS-
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ 1 [ 1 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA EMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ i /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /2R ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]













[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
LEAD ANALYST : J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
MECHIPBD
5104
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR BRAKE
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR CLUTCH/BRAKE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] .[ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTILRESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5107
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA-ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CI_AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicabie)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CENTERLINE LATCH GANG TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLINGS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















HDWlFUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-002-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [2/2R] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-002-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
Ix]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-002-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-002-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FME #: 02-4B-002-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5119
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]











[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PBD
5105
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR BRAKE
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02_4B-005-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR BRAKE
LEAD ANALYST : J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-006-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PBD
5109
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[P] [P] [P]
C ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-006-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-007-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-007-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IDA [ 1 /i ]
MECH/PBD-5111
02-4B-007-3
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]










CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-008-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: ¢If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.

















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ClL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B. C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]















NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5102
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MECH/PBD-5134
02-4B-I06-I
COSPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5134




[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-107-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











.HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ X ] *
ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-I09-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ALIGNMENT ROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-II0-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CENTERLINE LATCH ROLLER ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C N ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (I_ applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-110-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CENTERLINE LATCH ROLLER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTILRESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.


















NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5120




NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [.X ]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-140-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BULKHEAD READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH MODULE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]4392H[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RY__:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]















NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5159
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MAREKD
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-202-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA C I /I ] C ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5156
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
J. BACHER
NASA [ 1 /I ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5157





[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-202-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-203-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MOTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5147
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5149




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5151
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5152
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5153
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
Ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5150
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE BRAKE
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[x]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-204-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [" ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-204-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ i /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-204-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.















NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5155
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ i /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
















NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5157




NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
[x]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-206-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD BAY DOOR SHEAR/FLOATING HINGE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-207-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5168
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
J. BACHER
NASA [ 1 /I ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [







[ ] [ ]




[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-209-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NEW [ X ]
MECH/PBD
5169
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-403-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ ] [ ]








NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-403-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CILAND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-403-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4B-403-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.













NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MECH/PBD
5132




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ ] [ ]








NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.


















NEW [ X ]
MECHIETUD
3116
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH DIFFERENTIAL GEAR ASSEMBLY
J. BACHER
NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [







[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]













[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-012100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD
3123
DOOR CLOSURE TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
J. BACHER
NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-012100-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
Ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]




















NASA [ 1 /I ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD
3122
DOOR CLOSURE TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
J. BACHER
NASA [ 1 /i ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-012600-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]







NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE-LETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-012600-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-012600-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BRAKE
LEAD ANALYST : J . BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If.applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-012600-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY





NASA [ 1 /I ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [







C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-012600-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (I9 different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD
3135
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD
3136
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] IF] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD
3135
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
J. BACHER
NASA [ 1 /I ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD
3137







[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ][ 3
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[x]
[ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-013300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH LINKAGE





NASA [ 1 /I ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]

























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-013300-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]

























[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-013300-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ]. [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-013300-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH LINKAGE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
] IX]*
] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]














NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]

























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE
MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-013600-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ I /i ]





NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD
3136
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
J. BACHER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [p] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-013600-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH DIFFERENTIAL GEAR ASSEMBLY





NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]







] [ ] [
] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-013600-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-013600-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
C ] C ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C N ] C N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE
MARKED AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-013600-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.





NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-013700-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-014000-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CENTERLINE LATCH DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [
] [x]*
] [x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-014600-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]


















NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]






















NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ i /I ]
MECH/ETU-3107
02-4D-014600-I
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD
3107




[ P ] [ F ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 02-4D-014600-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA/CIL
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NASA FMEA/CIL AND IOA ANALYSES ARE MARKED
AS AN ISSUE UNTIL RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER.











NEW [ X ]
MECH/ETUD
3109
CENTERLINE _LATCH LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY-
ENGINEERING SERVICES
16055 SPACE CENTER BLVD, HOUSTON, TEXAS 77062
